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Corrupting Effectiveness: 
Utilitarianism and Moral Impartiality toward Future Persons in 
Pragmatic Evaluation of Altruistic Interventions. 
 
By Peter Scheyer  1
 
Introduction: Effective Altruism and the Far Future Trillions Argument 
In recent years billions of philanthropic dollars have been deployed through a movement 
and philosophy known as Effective Altruism, notably through the organizations Open Philanthropy, 
GiveWell, Good Ventures, and the over 3,200 persons taking the ‘Giving What We Can’ pledge to 
limit their personal income and donate the remainder to charity  . Effective Altruism, or EA, 2
explicitly aims to ‘use evidence and reasoning to determine the most effective ways to benefit 
others.’  3
Within the EA community there are competing viewpoints on how to evaluate effectiveness, 
which forms of evidence and reasoning are best, and several leading philosophers with their own 
adherents and value systems. The discussions surrounding the employment of these viewpoints can 
grow heated, with one commenter complaining that ‘Effective Altruism markets itself as being 
centered on addressing global poverty, when in fact it is centered on manipulating people into 
believing in the imaginary AI doomsday.’  4
This complaint highlights a major schism within EA. On one side is the empirical evaluation 
of existing altruistic interventions according to their own internal justifications - the attempts to 
judge the most effective way to solve current issues like global poverty, using hard data and statistics. 
On the other side is the a logically based rationalist effort to determine undervalued new 
interventions, bring them appropriate funding, and potentially solve issues which are ignored by 
mainstream altruism.  
From within the community, these two parts of the current EA community are often 
considered two sides of the same coin. Extrapolations of techniques used to evaluate current 
interventions often provide the justification for attempting new interventions, and can highlight 
areas worth a closer examination or the allocation of more funding.  
Over time, a single paradigm has come to dominate many of these extrapolations, leading to 
the complaint above. Nicholas Beckstead, a program officer at Open Philanthropy, laid out the 
argument underpinning this paradigm in a 2013 doctoral thesis titled ‘On the Overwhelming 
Importance of Shaping the Far Future.’   The argument in this thesis, which we will call the Far 5
1 With assistance from The Foresight Institute, Haley Madel, Allison Duettmann, Benjamin 
Hoffman, Benjamin Scheyer, Clayton Faits, the Centre for Effective Altruism, and his wife Jennifer 
Scheyer, as well as various individuals who offered glad ears and advice. 
2 (Matthews) 
3 (Centre for Effective Altruism) 
4 (mystery-babylon) 
5 (Beckstead) 
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Future Trillions Argument (FFTA), is central to many of the most heated discussions in how to best 
employ the billions of dollars of the Effective Altruism. 
After careful consideration it is our reasoned opinion that the Far Future Trillions Argument 
and its resulting recommendations, while internally coherent and defensible, are not within the remit 
of a movement characterized by the use of evidence in determining the effectiveness of altruistic 
interventions. This overall conclusion is based on seven separate arguments.  
The first argument is based on empirical evaluation of foreign aid interventions, and 
concludes that characteristics of the FFTA are inimical to effective interventions. Our second and 
third arguments conclude that the FFTA lacks certain characteristics of pragmatic models, and 
requires empirically fallacious methodological assumptions to connect far future outcomes with 
present interventions. Fourth and fifth, we argue that the purely rationalist, philosophical nature of 
the FFTA divorces it from evidence in a way that inherently foils the determination of the 
effectiveness of interventions based upon it. Our sixth and seventh arguments take issue with the 
ongoing privileged employ of the version of utilitarianism and moral impartiality toward future 
persons used in the FFTA and its offshoot justifications, asserting that the inclusion of a full and 
wider scope of normative justifications is necessary for pragmatic modeling. 
 
The Far Future Trillions Argument 
Nicholas Beckstead’s version of the Far Future Trillions Argument (FFTA)   is:  6
Humanity may survive for millions, billions, or trillions of years.  
If humanity may survive may survive for millions, billions, or trillions of years, then the 
expected value of the future is astronomically great.  
Some of the actions humanity could take would be expected to shape the trajectory along 
which our descendants develop in not-ridiculously-small ways.  
If the expected value of the future is astronomically great and some of the actions humanity 
could take would be expected to shape the trajectory along which our descendants develop in 
not-ridiculously-small ways, then from a global perspective, what matters most (in expectation) is 
that we do what is best (in expectation) for the general trajectory along which our descendants 
develop over the coming millions, billions, and trillions of years.  
Therefore, from a global perspective, what matters most (in expectation) is that we do what 
is best (in expectation) for the general trajectory along which our descendants develop over the 
coming millions, billions, and trillions of years. 
To connect the FFTA to specific interventions three steps are necessary. To determine what 
is best (in expectation), we can first, evaluate potential outcomes using utilitarianism. Second, we can 
assign an approximate likelihood of our actions contributing to these outcomes. Third, we can value 
interventions using arguments based on resulting statements. For example, ‘the fact that an 
existential risk of x% means that the future has x% less expected value than it would if there were 
no risk.’  7
The FFTA is shortened and restated practically by the Centre for Effective Altruism   (CEA 8
Handbook 2017) as: The long-term future has enormous potential: our descendants could live for 
billions or trillions of years, and have very high-quality lives; It seems likely there are things we can 
6 (Beckstead) 
7 (Beckstead), p.6 
8 (Centre for Effective Altruism) 
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do today that will affect the long-term future in nonnegligible ways; Possible ways of shaping the 
long-term future are currently highly neglected by individuals and society; Given points 1 to 3 above, 
actions aimed at shaping the long-term future seem to have extremely high expected value  , higher 9
than any actions aiming for more near-term benefits. 
For our purposes, eight clarifications of the far-future trillions argument are useful.  
1. The FFTA includes reasoning from long timeframes. 
2. The FFTA includes reasoning from sets of possible specific futures. 
3. The FFTA includes reasoning from the well-being of future persons. 
4. The FFTA asserts we should attempt to improve, or ‘aid,’ future persons. 
5. The FFTA explicitly asserts utilitarianism as a doctrine. 
6. The FFTA is philosophically based on rationalism, ‘a belief or theory that opinions and 
actions should be based on reason and knowledge rather than on religious belief or 
emotional response.’ 
7. The FFTA requires hypothetical estimations of approximate EV to make consequentialist 
arguments. 
8. The FFTA requires the use of hypothetical probabilities and outcomes. 
  
First Argument: Aid interventions incorporating the FFTA in their design are less 
likely than other interventions to be effective . 
It is held within the pragmatic consequentialist framework that the justification for an 
intervention is immaterial to the outcome. However, a large body of work suggests that this is not 
the case, and that the arguments and spirit in which an intervention is undertaken can have subtle 
yet immense impacts on its effectiveness.   For our purposes, aspects of the FFTA place concerning 10
handicaps, negatively influencing the metrics and scale of interventions, changing whether an 
intervention is aiming at a specific hypothetical future or an improved circumstance for its targets, 
and determining the frequency and relevance to planning of interactions with the aided.  
This argument requires four premises. First, effective is defined as ‘successful in producing a 
desired or intended result.’ Second, aid interventions including long timeframes in their design are 
less likely to be successful in producing desired or intended results.     Third, Aid interventions 11 12
including possible specific futures in their design are less likely to be successful in producing desired 
9 Expected value (EV) can be defined as ‘The expected value is the sum of the value of each 
potential outcome multiplied by the probability of that outcome occurring.’ 
10 James C. Scott’s  Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve The Human Condition Have Failed,  is 
an important overview work of this topic, while the examples used in the rest of this section are less 
philosophical and more empirical. For similar perspectives specifically applied to foreign aid 
interventions Easterly provides valuable context .  (Scott), (Easterly, The White Man's Burden: Why 
the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good) 
11  ‘With smaller interventions, more rigorous evaluation is available to address the counterfactual 
question.’ (Easterly, The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done 
So Much Ill and So Little Good), p. 53 
12 The use of randomized timeframes in evaluating the effectiveness of aid has been studied carefully 
and demonstrates that any lengthy, specific timeframe is less likely to be effective than 
randomization in timeframe selection. (Popper)(Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer) 
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or intended results.       Fourth, aid interventions which do not include provisions for feedback 13 14 15
from the aided are less likely to be successful in producing desired or intended results.    16 17
As noted in clarifications 1 and 2, The FFTA requires reasoning from long timeframes and 
reasoning from sets of possible specific futures. Through its assumptions of what constitutes the 
well-being of future persons in clarification 3, the FFTA does not include provisions for feedback 
from the aided. Inclusion of an argument in a design includes the reasoning of the argument in the 
design.  
In conclusion, aid interventions including the FFTA in their design are less likely to be 
successful in producing desired or intended results than some which do not incorporate the FFTA 
in their design. 
  
Second Argument: Models including the FFTA without discounting are not justified 
as pragmatic in considering the relative impact of comparable altruistic efforts on the 
future. 
Discounting refers to determining the present value of a payment or a stream of payments 
that is to be received in the future. Discounting methods are required to first, factor comparative 
opportunity costs into the model, and second, to consider compounding returns on alternatives 
which benefit from reinvestment.   Opportunity costs refer to the loss of potential gain from other 18
alternatives when one alternative is chosen. Compounded returns arise when an investment results 
in an increase in resources, which can then be added to the original sum invested. When the new 
total is reinvested the returns are said to be compounding, using a definition of compound as a verb 
meaning to ‘calculate (interest) on previously accumulated interest.’ 
Modeling without discounting is only justified as pragmatic if either the timeframe modeled 
does not include alternatives of comparable outcome, or alternatives of comparable outcome cannot 
be modeled.   Comparable alternatives to FFTA interventions exist in altruistic endeavors, and these 19
comparable alternatives can be modeled. In conclusion, models including the FFTA without 
discounting are not justified as pragmatic. 
  
13  Karl Popper asserted that ‘utopian social engineering’ is less effective than piecemeal democratic 
reform in  The Poverty of Historicism,  p.61. (Popper) 
14 Abhijit Banerjee has compiled a lengthy list of possible interventions which have been verified as 
cost-effective uses of foreign aid. Linking such interventions together as needed is building an 
intervention out of proven blocks, as opposed to a utopian scheme. (Banerjee) 
15 Pitfalls of centralized planning in banking. (Whittle and Kuraishi) 
16 Easterly,  The White Man’s Burden,  ‘Westerners: don’t do things to or for other people without 
giving them a way to let you know – and hold you accountable for – what you have actually done to 
or for them.’  p. 381 ‘Discard your patronizing confidence that you know how to solve other 
people’s problems better than they do.’ p.368 (Easterly, The White Man's Burden: Why the West's 
Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good) 
17  See  (De Renzio),  
18  See  Kruschwitz, L., & Loffler, A. (2006).  Discounted Cash Flow: A Theory of the Valuation of Firms, . 
West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
 
19  
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Third Argument: Justifications based on the FFTA are empirically fallacious, and as 
such are directly not justified in the philosophical system implied by colloquial use of 
the term ‘effective.’ 
Argument 1 states ‘the use of effective as an adjective only explicitly  includes 
consequentialism and empiricism.’ Deductions based on specific hypothetical probabilities, outside 
of understood contexts such as games or certain areas of physics, are empirically fallacious.      20 21 22
Empirically fallacious deductions are not justified within empiricist philosophical systems. The term 
‘effective’ colloquially mandates an empiricist philosophical system. 
Definitional clarification 7.1 states the FFTA requires hypothetical estimations of 
approximate EV, including the use of hypothetical probabilities and outcomes, to make 
consequentialist assertions. The FFTA is empirically fallacious when making consequentialist 
assertions. 
In conclusion, justifications from consequentialist assertions of the FFTA are empirically 
fallacious, and as such are directly not justified in the philosophical system implied by colloquial use 
of the term ‘effective.’ 
 
Fourth Argument: It is reasonable to expect a philosophy and social movement called 
Effective Altruism (EA) to only include philosophical positions justified by the 
colloquial use of the adjective ‘effective.’ 
Our argument is based on five premises. First, effective is defined as ‘successful in producing 
a desired or intended result.’   Second, altruism is defined as ‘the belief in or practice of disinterested 23
and selfless concern for the well-being of others.’ Third, Effective Altruism (EA) self-defines as ‘a 
philosophy and social movement that uses evidence and reasoning to determine the most effective 
ways to benefit others.’   Fourth, colloquial is defined as ‘used in ordinary or familiar conversation.’ 24
And Fifth, usage of a word or phrase is ‘colloquial’ if it adheres to its ordinary and/or dictionary 
definition and usage. 
‘Effective altruism’ could be strictly defined as an attempt to be successful in producing a 
desired or intended result, where that result is the belief in or practice of disinterested and selfless 
concern for the well-being of others. The stated definition of EA and the colloquial definition of 
effective altruism are close enough to warrant a literal interpretation of the constituent terms. It is 
reasonable to expect a philosophy and social movement to only include philosophical positions 
justified directly by a colloquial interpretation of its constituent terms.  
It is  not reasonable to expect a philosophy and social movement to  not only include 
philosophical positions justified by a colloquial interpretation of its constituent terms, unless the 
additional inclusion is justified in one of three ways: directly, by additional constituent terms; 
indirectly, by philosophical positions included in a colloquial interpretation of the philosophy and 
social movement’s constituent terms; contextually, by a requirement for the inclusion of additional 
philosophical positions to prevent the philosophy and social movement from being nonsensical. 
20 (Taleb, Fooled by Randomness; The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the Markets) 
21 (Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable) 
22 (Popper) 
23 All definitions used are from Google Search, Google. 11 Oct 2018. Web. 11 Oct 2018 
24 (Centre for Effective Altruism) 
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Altruism is restricted by the use of the adjective ‘effective’ in this context to the 
philosophical justifications implicit in the term ‘effective.’ The phrase ‘effective altruism’ is not 
nonsensical, and does not contextually require additional philosophical positions. 
In conclusion, it is reasonable to expect a philosophy and social movement called Effective 
Altruism (EA) to only include philosophical positions justified by the colloquial use of the adjective 
‘effective.’ 
  
Fifth Argument: The use of the adjective effective only explicitly  asserts a 
philosophical system requiring consequentialism and empiricism . 
This argument uses six premises. 
1. Effective is defined as ‘successful in producing a desired or intended result.’ 
2. Altruism is defined as ‘the belief in or practice of disinterested and selfless concern 
for the well-being of others.’ 
3. Consequentialism is defined as ‘the doctrine that the morality of an action is to be 
judged solely by its consequences.’ 
4. Pragmatic Ethics assert that ‘norms, principles, and moral criteria are likely to be 
improved as a result of inquiry.’ 
5. Empiricism is defined as ‘the theory that all knowledge is derived from 
sense-experience.’ 
6. Result is synonymous with consequence. 
In evaluating whether altruism is effective the success of an action desired or intended to be 
altruistic is judged by its desired or intended result. The conjunction of the terms effective and 
altruism asserts the success of altruistic action is judged by its desired or intended result. Effective 
altruism therefore seeks to make altruism more effective, placing a moral judgment on altruistic 
endeavors based on their success in producing their desired or intended result.  
To the extent that it confers moral judgments solely based on effectiveness, use of effective 
as an adjective requires an adherence to consequentialism by definition. The past tense of effective’s 
‘successful in producing’ component implies that judgments of effectiveness are derived from data. 
Use of the adjective effective therefore implies adherence to empirical principles of knowledge 
derivation. The conjunction of empiricism and consequentialism defines the colloquial meaning of 
the term ‘effective’ as adhering to pragmatic ethics. Pragmatic considerations may justify alternative 
philosophies, if subjected to inquiry prior to inclusion. 
The definition of effective consists of only the above parts. In this context, altruism is 
restricted to the philosophical justifications implicit in the term ‘effective.’ In conclusion, the use of 
effective as an adjective only explicitly  asserts a philosophical system requiring consequentialism and 
empiricism. 
 
  
Sixth Argument: Utilitarianism does not deserve automatic inclusion or a privileged 
place among pragmatic consequentialist justifications. 
To deserve automatic inclusion among justifications a normative philosophy must lack 
relevant critiques. Utilitarianism has relevant critiques. Empiricist critiques of Utilitarianism suggest 
it is particularly poor for planning altruistic endeavors.   Deontologist critiques include the lack of 25
25 (Popper) 
1/6/2019 20190103CorruptingEffectiveness - Google Docs
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1WT15jqISmIHss5NlqZ9ZO_xBHxw4CgGqVOl4SInk8lk/edit# 7/9
utilitarian provision for human rights.   Virtue ethical critiques note that utility satisfaction prioritizes 26
the apparent preferences of persons without seeking to improve said persons  , and thus ends in a 27
lowest-common-denominator version of humanity.   28
There are even utilitarian critiques of the version of utilitarianism used in this discourse, 
noting that it tends to be a quantified ex post facto rationalization of personal preferences rather 
than a serious attempt to maximize utility.   Among normative philosophies utilitarianism is 29
particularly prone to these issues due to its use of algorithms and quantified abstractions, while other 
normative philosophies insist that normative answers require philosophically engaging with hard 
moral questions.  30
In order to deserve automatic inclusion among justifications a normative philosophy must 
lack equally compelling alternatives. Compelling alternatives to utilitarianism exist. Deontological 
justifications have data and good track records in aid.   Virtue Ethical justifications also exist.   31 32
In conclusion, utilitarianism does not deserve automatic inclusion or a privileged place 
among altruistic justifications. 
 
Seventh Argument: Moral Impartiality toward Future Persons does not deserve 
automatic inclusion or a privileged place among pragmatic consequentialist 
justifications. 
To deserve automatic inclusion among justifications a normative philosophy must lack 
relevant critiques. Moral impartiality toward future persons has relevant critiques, two of which I will 
present here. First, a common-sense perspective suggests partiality toward oneself is reasonable, 
possibly even necessary, in sustained altruism  . Second, strict moral impartiality toward  present 33
persons and entities is an extremely demanding form of consequentialism  , and the future variant 34
glosses over these demands as ‘outweighed by the mass of future persons’ without due 
consideration. 
To deserve automatic inclusion among justifications a normative philosophy must lack 
equally compelling alternatives, and compelling alternatives to moral impartiality toward future 
26 (Kant) 
27 (Kant), also (Sandel, Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?) 
28 (Mill), (Kant), (Sandel, Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?) 
29 (Sandel, Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?) 
30 (Sandel, What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets) 
31 (Easterly, The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much 
Ill and So Little Good) 
32 Aquinas wrote extensively on the topic of Charity in the development of virtue, see Sherwin, 
Michael S.  By knowledge & by love: charity and knowledge in the moral theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. CUA 
Press, 2005. 
33 The existence of the concept of supererogation requires the concept of a baseline amount of duty 
required of moral beings. Efforts in other areas, i.e. personal sustenance, involves a degree of 
personal partiality if they are considered mandatory, yet most altruists agree a certain amount of 
responsibility must be taken for one’s own well-being, and that concomitant efforts are excusable. 
34  See  Pinker, Steven.  Enlightenment now: The case for reason, science, humanism, and progress.  Penguin Books, 
2019. 
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persons exist. Partiality toward present persons and interventions is preferred by pragmatic 
empiricists  . 35
In conclusion, Moral Impartiality does not deserve automatic inclusion or a privileged place 
among altruistic justifications. 
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